G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998,
♦ Decision, Panganiban, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Mendoza, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Romero, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion, Vitug, [J]

EN BANC

G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998

SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.


Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., separate opinion;

The 1987 Constitution, like the counterpart 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has continued to be implicit in its recognition of the time-honored precept of separation of powers which enjoins upon each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government — the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary — proper acknowledgment and respect for each other. The Supreme Court, said to be holding neither the "purse" (held by Congress) nor the "sword" (held by the Executive) but serving as the balance wheel in the State governance, functions both as the tribunal of last resort and as the Constitutional Court of the nation.1 Peculiar, however, to the present Constitution, specifically under Article VII, Section 1, thereof, is the extended jurisdiction of judicial power that now explicitly allows the determination of "whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."2 This expanded concept of judicial power seems to have been dictated by the martial law experience and to be an immediate reaction to the abuse in the frequent recourse to the political question doctrine that in no small measure has emasculated the Court. The term "political question," in this context, refers to matters which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.

The Supreme Court, nevertheless, should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. I find it here opportune to reiterate what I have stated in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance,3 viz:

I cannot yet concede to the novel theory, so challengingly provocative as it might be, that under the 1987 Constitution the Court may now at good liberty intrude, in the guise of the people's imprimatur, into every affair of government. What significance can still then remain, I ask, of the time honored and widely acclaimed principle of separation of powers if, at every turn, the Court allows itself to pass upon at will the disposition of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch in our system of government. I dread to think of the so varied uncertainties that such an undue interference can lead to. The respect for long standing doctrines in our jurisprudence, nourished through time, is one of maturity, not timidity, of stability rather than quiescence.

Pervasive and limitless, such as it, may seem to be, judicial power still succumbs to the paramount doctrine of separation of powers. Congress is the branch of government, composed of the representatives of the people, that lays down the policies of government and provides the direction that the nation must take. The Executive carries out that mandate. Certainly, the Court will not negate that which is done by these, co-equal and co-ordinate branches merely because of a perceived case of grave abuse of discretion on their part, clearly too relative a phrase to be its own sentinel against misuse, even as it will not hesitate to wield the power if that abuse becomes all too clear. The exercise of judicial statesmanship, not judicial tyranny, is what has been envisioned by and institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution.

There is no harnbook rule by which grave abuse of discretion may be determined.ℒαwρhi৷ The provision was evidently couched in general terms to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any contemporary or emerging millieu. In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting, to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or at the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner such as by reason of passion or personal hostility. When the question, however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, I would subscribe to the dictum, somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs. De Venecia,4 that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court will not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. Verily, in this situation, it is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention.

In the instant settings, I find insufficient indication to have the case hew to the above rule.ℒαwρhi৷

Accordingly, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.


Footnotes

1 Justice Jose C. Vitug, The court and its Ways, The Court System Journal, June 1998, Volume 3 No. 2.

2 Sec. 1, Article VIII.

3 235 SCRA 630, 720.

4 277 SCRA 268, 289.
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