G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998,
♦ Decision,
Panganiban, [J]
♦ Concurring and Dissenting Opinion,
Mendoza, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion,
Romero, [J]
♦ Separate Opinion,
Vitug, [J]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners,
vs.
SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part;
I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I disagree that "[it] has jurisdiction over the petition [in this case] to determine whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives."1
The Court has no jurisdiction over this case. The question who constitute the minority in the Senate entitled to elect the minority leader of that chamber is political. It respects the internal affairs of a coequal department of the government and is thus addressed solely to that august body.
Courts have no power to inquire into the internal organization and business of a house of Congress except as the question affects the rights of third parties or a specific constitutional limitation is involved.
For this reason this Court has declined to take cognizance of cases involving the discipline of members2 of the legislature and the application and interpretation of the rules of procedure of a house.3 For indeed, these matters pertain to the internal government of Congress and are within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Dean Sinco has pointed out that the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate are not state officers. They do not attain these positions by popular vote but only by the vote of their respective chambers. They receive their mandate as such not from the voters but from their peers in the house. While their offices are a constitutional creation, nevertheless they are only legislative officers. It is their position as members of Congress which gives them the status of state officers. As presiding officers of their respective chambers, their election as well as removal is determined by the vote of the majority of the members of the house to which they belong.4 Thus, Art VI, §16(1) of the Constitution provides:
The Senate shall elect its President and the of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.ᇈWᑭHIL
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
This is likewise true of the "other officers" of each house whose election and removal rest solely within the prerogative of the members and is no concern of the courts.
Indeed, in those cases in which this Court took cognizance of matters pertaining to the internal government of each house, infringements of specific constitutional limitations were alleged.ᇈWᑭHIL
In Avelino v. Cuenco,5 the question was whether with only 12 senators present there was a quorum for the election of the Senate President, considering that, of the 24 members, one was in the hospital while another one was abroad. The case called for an interpretation of Art. VI, §10(2) of the 1935 Constitution which provided that "A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business. . . ." While initially declining to assume jurisdiction, this Court finally took cognizance of the matter. As Justice Perfecto, whose separate opinion in support of the assumption of jurisdiction was one of the reasons which persuaded the Court to intervene in the Senate imbroglio, stated, "Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators . . . is a question that calls for the interpretation, application and enforcement of an express and specific provision of the Constitution."6 In his view, "The word quorum is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2)."7
In Tañada v. Cuenco,8 the question was whether the majority could fill the seats intended for the minority party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal when there are not enough minority members in the Senate. Again, the question was governed by a specific provision (Art. VI, §11) of the 1935 charter which provided that the Electoral Tribunals of each house should be composed of "nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court . . . I and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon the nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein." There was, therefore, a specific constitutional provision to be applied.
The cases9 concerning the composition of the Commission on Appointments likewise involved the mere application of a constitutional provision, specifically Art. VI, §18 of the present Constitution which provides that the Commission shall be composed of "twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein." Undoubtedly, the Court had jurisdiction over the cases.
On the other hand, as long as the proportional representation of political parties and organizations is observed the Court has held itself to be without jurisdiction over the choice of nominees. In Cabili v. Francisco,10 it declined to take cognizance of a quo warranto suit seeking to annul the recomposition of the Senate representation in the Commission and to reinstate a particular senator after satisfying itself that such recomposition of the Senate representation was not a "departure from the constitution mandate requiring proportional representation of the political organizations in the Commission on Appointments."
It is true that in Cunanan v. Tan11 this Court took cognizance of the case which involved the reorganization of the Commission as a result of the realignment of political forces in the House of Representatives and the formation of a temporary alliance. But the Court's decision was justified because the case actually involved the right of a third party whose nomination by the President had been rejected by the reorganized Commission. As held in Pacete v. The Secretary of the Commission on Appointments.12 where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is judicial in character.
In contrast to the specific constitutional limitations involved in the foregoing cases, beyond providing that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall elect a President and Speaker, respectively, and such other officers as each house shall determine "by a majority vote of all [their] respective Members," the Constitution leaves everything else to each house of Congress. Such matters are political and are left solely to the judgment of the legislative department of the government.
This case involves neither an infringement of specific constitutional limitations nor a violation of the rights of a party not a member of Congress. This Court has jurisdiction over this case only in the sense that determining whether the question involved is reserved to Congress is itself an exercise of jurisdiction in the same way that a court which dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction must in a narrow sense have jurisdiction since it cannot dismiss the case if it were otherwise. The determination of whether the question involved is justiciable or not is in itself a process of constitutional interpretation. This is the great lesson of Marbury v. Madison13 in which the U.S. Supreme Court, while affirming its power of review, in the end held itself to be without jurisdiction because the Judiciary Act of 1789 granting it jurisdiction over that case was unconstitutional. In other words, a court doing a Marbury v. Madison has no jurisdiction except to declare itself without jurisdiction over the case.
I vote to dismiss the petition in this case for lack of jurisdiction.
Footnotes
1 Majority Opinion. p. 18.
2 Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924) (suspension of senator for disorderly conduct for assaulting a fellow senator): Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960) (suspension of senator for disorderly behavior for imputing bribery to President Garcia)
3 Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997) (power of each house to determine its rules of proceedings)
4 VICENTE G. SINCO, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 171-172 (11th ed. 1962).
5 83 Phil. 17 (1949).
6 Id., at 50.
7 Id., at 79.
8 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
9 Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989); Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., 187 SCRA. 377 (1990); Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
10 88 Phil. 654 (1951).
11 115 Phil. vii (1962).
12 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
13 Cranch 137, 2L.Ed. 60 (1803).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
