EN BANC
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
Separate Opinions
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring and dissenting opinion;
I concur in the basic premises of the majority opinion. However, I dissent in its final conclusions and the dispositive portion.
With all due respect, the majority opinion centers on procedure but unfortunately ignores the substantive merits which this procedure should unavoidably sustain.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals had only one basic reason for its denial of the petition, i.e., the application of the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. This Court's majority ponencia correctly reverses the Court of Appeals on this issue. The ponencia now states that the issuance of CLOA's to farmer beneficiaries deprived petitioner Roxas & Co. of its property without just compensation. It rules that the acts of the Department of Agrarian Reform are patently illegal. It concludes that petitioner's rights were violated, and thus to require it to exhaust administrative remedies before DAR was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Correctly, petitioner sought immediate redress from the Court of Appeals to this Court.
However, I respectfully dissent from the judgment which remands the case to the DAR. If the acts of DAR are patently illegal and the rights of Roxas & Co. violated, the wrong decisions of DAR should be reversed and set aside. It follows that the fruits of the wrongful acts, in this case the illegally issued CLOAs, must be declared null and void.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. Inc. is the registered owner of three (3) haciendas located in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely: Hacienda Palico comprising of an area of 1,024 hectares more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 985 (Petition, Annex "G"; Rollo, p. 203); Hacienda Banilad comprising an area of 1,050 hectares and covered by TCT No. 924 (Petition, Annex "I"; Rollo, p. 205); and Hacienda Caylaway comprising an area of 867.4571 hectares and covered by TCT Nos. T-44655 (Petition, Annex "O"; Rollo, p. 216), T-44662 (Petition, Annex "P"; Rollo, p. 217), T-44663 (Petition, Annex "Q"; Rollo, p. 210) and T-44664 (Petition, Annex "R"; Rollo, p. 221).
Sometime in 1992 and 1993, petitioner filed applications for conversion with DAR. Instead of either denying or approving the applications, DAR ignored and sat on them for seven (7) years. In the meantime and in acts of deceptive lip-service, DAR excluded some small and scattered lots in Palico and Caylaway from CARP coverage. The majority of the properties were parceled out to alleged farmer-beneficiaries, one at a time, even as petitioner's applications were pending and unacted upon.
The majority ponencia cites Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 on the procedure for acquisition of private lands.
The ponencia cites the detailed procedures found in DAR Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 for the identification of the land to be acquired. DAR did not follow its own prescribed procedures. There was no valid issuance of a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition.
The procedure on the evaluation and determination of land valuation, the duties of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) and the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), the documentation and reports on the step-by-step process, the screening of prospective Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs), the land survey and segregation survey plan, and other mandatory procedures were not followed. The landowner was not properly informed of anything going on.
Equally important, there was no payment of just compensation. I agree with the ponencia that due process was not observed in the taking of petitioner's properties. Since the DAR did not validly acquire ownership over the lands, there was no acquired property to validly convey to any beneficiary. The CLOAs were null and void from the start.
Petitioner states that the notices of acquisition were sent by respondents by ordinary mail only, thereby disregarding the procedural requirement that notices be served personally or by registered mail. This is not disputed by respondents, but they allege that petitioner changed its address without notifying the DAR. Notably, the procedure prescribed speaks of only two modes of service of notices of acquisition — personal service and service by registered mail. The non-inclusion of other modes of service can only mean that the legislature intentionally omitted them. In other words, service of a notice of acquisition other than personally or by registered mail is not valid. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. The reason is obvious. Personal service and service by registered mail are methods that ensure the receipt by the addressee, whereas service by ordinary mail affords no reliable proof of receipt.
Since it governs the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the CARL should be strictly construed. Consequently, faithful compliance with its provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands, should be observed. Therefore, the service by respondent DAR of the notices of acquisition to petitioner by ordinary mail, not being in conformity with the mandate of R.A. 6657, is invalid and ineffective.
With more reason, the compulsory acquisition of portions of Hacienda Palico, for which no notices of acquisition were issued by the DAR, should be declared invalid.
The entire ponencia, save for the last six (6) pages, deals with the mandatory procedures promulgated by law and DAR and how they have not been complied with. There can be no debate over the procedures and their violation. However, I respectfully dissent in the conclusions reached in the last six pages. Inspite of all the violations, the deprivation of petitioner's rights, the non-payment of just compensation, and the consequent nullity of the CLOAs, the Court is remanding the case to the DAR for it to act on the petitioner's pending applications for conversion which have been unacted upon for seven (7) years.
Petitioner had applications for conversion pending with DAR. Instead of deciding them one way or the other, DAR sat on the applications for seven (7) years. At that same time it rendered the applications inutile by distributing CLOAs to alleged tenants. This action is even worse than a denial of the applications because DAR had effectively denied the application against the applicant without rendering a formal decision. This kind of action preempted any other kind of decision except denial. Formal denial was even unnecessary. In the case of Hacienda Palico, the application was in fact denied on November 8, 1993.
There are indisputable and established factors which call for a more definite and clearer judgment.
The basic issue in this case is whether or not the disputed property is agricultural in nature and covered by CARP. That petitioner's lands are non-agricultural in character is clearly shown by the evidence presented by petitioner, all of which were not disputed by respondents. The disputed property is definitely not subject to CARP.
The nature of the land as non-agricultural has been resolved by the agencies with primary jurisdiction and competence to decide the issue, namely — (1) a Presidential Proclamation in 1975; (2) Certifications from the Department of Agriculture; (3) a Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Nasugbu, approved by the Province of Batangas; and (4) by clear inference and admissions, Administrative Orders and Guidelines promulgated by DAR itself.
The records show that on November 20, 1975 even before the enactment of the CARP law, the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas was declared a "tourist zone" in the exercise of lawmaking power by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under Proclamation No. 1520 (Rollo, pp. 122-123). This Presidential Proclamation is indubitably part of the law of the land.
On 20 March 1992 the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu promulgated its Resolution No. 19, a zonification ordinance (Rollo, pp. 124-200), pursuant to its powers under Republic Act No. 7160, i.e., the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipal ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas (Rollo, p. 201). Under this enactment, portions of the petitioner's properties within the municipality were re-zonified as intended and appropriate for non-agricultural uses. These two issuances, together with Proclamation 1520, should be sufficient to determine the nature of the land as non-agricultural. But there is more.
The records also contain a certification dated March 1, 1993 from the Director of Region IV of the Department of Agriculture that the disputed lands are no longer economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes (Rollo, p. 213).
DAR itself impliedly accepted and determined that the municipality of Nasugbu is non-agricultural when it affirmed the force and effect of Presidential Proclamation 1520. In an Order dated January 22, 1991, DAR granted the conversion of the adjoining and contiguous landholdings owned by Group Developer and Financiers, Inc. in Nasugbu pursuant to the Presidential Proclamation. The property alongside the disputed properties is now known as "Batulao Resort Complex". As will be shown later, the conversion of various other properties in Nasugbu has been ordered by DAR, including a property disputed in this petition, Hacienda Caylaway.
Inspite of all the above, the Court of Appeals concluded that the lands comprising petitioner's haciendas are agricultural, citing, among other things, petitioner's acts of voluntarily offering Hacienda Caylaway for sale and applying for conversion its lands from agricultural to non-agricultural.
Respondents, on the other hand, did not only ignore the administrative and executive decisions. It also contended that the subject land should be deemed agricultural because it is neither residential, commercial, industrial or timber. The character of a parcel of land, however, is not determined merely by a process of elimination. The actual use which the land is capable of should be the primordial factor.
RA 6657 explicitly limits its coverage thus:
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for a agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon." (RA 6657, Sec. 4; emphasis provided)
In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform and Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, this Court had occasion to rule that agricultural lands are only those which are arable and suitable.
It is at once noticeable that the common factor that classifies land use as agricultural, whether it be public or private land, is its suitability for agriculture. In this connection, RA 6657 defines "agriculture" as follows:
Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. (RA 6657, sec. 3[b])
In the case at bar, petitioner has presented certifications issued by the Department of Agriculture to the effect that Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are not feasible and economically viable for agricultural development due to marginal productivity of the soil, based on an examination of their slope, terrain, depth, irrigability, fertility, acidity, and erosion factors (Petition, Annex "L", Rollo, p. 213; Annex "U", Rollo, p. 228). This finding should be accorded respect considering that it came from competent authority, said Department being the agency possessed with the necessary expertise to determine suitability of lands to agriculture. The DAR Order dated January 22, 1991 issued by respondent itself stated that the adjacent land now known as the Batulao Resort Complex is hilly, mountainous, and with long and narrow ridges and deep gorges. No permanent sites are planted. Cultivation is by kaingin method. This confirms the findings of the Department of Agriculture.
Parenthetically, the foregoing finding of the Department of Agriculture also explains the validity of the reclassification of petitioner's lands by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas, pursuant to Section 20 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It shows that the condition imposed by respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform on petitioner for withdrawing its voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, i.e., that the soil be unsuitable for agriculture, has been adequately met. In fact, the DAR in its Order in Case No. A-9999-050-97, involving a piece of land also owned by petitioner and likewise located in Caylaway, exempted it from the coverage of CARL (Order dated May 17, 1999; Annex "D" of Petitioner's Manifestation), on these grounds.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, the subject lands are within an area declared in 1975 by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 to be part of a tourist zone. This determination was made when the tourism prospects of the area were still for the future. The studies which led to the land classification were relatively freer from pressures and, therefore, more objective and open-minded. Respondent, however, contends that agriculture is not incompatible with the lands' being part of a tourist zone since "agricultural production, by itself, is a natural asset and, if properly set, can command tremendous aesthetic value in the form of scenic views and variety of countryside profiles." (Comment, Rollo, 579).
The contention is untenable. Tourist attractions are not limited to scenic landscapes and lush greeneries. Verily, tourism is enhanced by structures and facilities such as hotels, resorts, rest houses, sports clubs and golf courses, all of which bind the land and render it unavailable for cultivation. As aptly described by petitioner:
The development of resorts, golf courses, and commercial centers is inconsistent with agricultural development. True, there can be limited agricultural production within the context of tourism development. However, such small scale farming activities will be dictated by, and subordinate to the needs or tourism development. In fact, agricultural use of land within Nasugbu may cease entirely if deemed necessary by the Department of Tourism (Reply, Rollo, p. 400).
The lands subject hereof, therefore, are non-agricultural. Hence, the voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway should not be deemed an admission that the land is agricultural. Rather, the offer was made by petitioner in good faith, believing at the time that the land could still be developed for agricultural production. Notably, the offer to sell was made as early as May 6, 1988, before the soil thereon was found by the Department of Agriculture to be unsuitable for agricultural development (the Certifications were issued on 2 February 1993 and 1 March 1993). Petitioner's withdrawal of its voluntary offer to sell, therefore, was not borne out of a whimsical or capricious change of heart. Quite simply, the land turned out to be outside of the coverage of the CARL, which by express provision of RA 6657, Section 4, affects only public and private agricultural lands. As earlier stated, only on May 17, 1999, DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, Jr. approved the application for a lot in Caylaway, also owned by petitioner, and confirmed the seven (7) documentary evidences proving the Caylaway area to be non-agricultural (DAR Order dated 17 May 1999, in Case No. A-9999-050-97, Annex "D" Manifestation).
The DAR itself has issued administrative circulars governing lands which are outside of CARP and may not be subjected to land reform. Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996 declares in its policy statement what landholdings are outside the coverage of CARP. The AO is explicit in providing that such non-covered properties shall be reconveyed to the original transferors or owners.
These non-covered lands are:
a. Land, or portions thereof, found to be no longer suitable for agriculture and, therefore, could not be given appropriate valuation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
b. Those were a Conversion Order has already been issued by the DAR allowing the use of the landholding other than for agricultural purposes in accordance with Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 and Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994;
c. Property determined to be exempted from CARP coverage pursuant to Department of Justice Opinion Nos. 44 and 181; or
d. Where a Presidential Proclamation has been issued declaring the subject property for certain uses other than agricultural. (Annex "F", Manifestation dated July 23, 1999)
The properties subject of this Petition are covered by the first, third, and fourth categories of the Administrative Order. The DAR has disregarded its own issuances which implement the law.
To make the picture clearer, I would like to summarize the law, regulations, ordinances, and official acts which show beyond question that the disputed property is non-agricultural, namely:
(a) The Law. Proclamation 1520 dated November 20, 1975 is part of the law of the land. It declares the area in and around Nasugbu, Batangas, as a Tourist Zone. It has not been repealed, and has in fact been used by DAR to justify conversion of other contiguous and nearby properties of other parties.
(b) Ordinances of Local Governments. Zoning ordinance of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, affirmed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas, expressly defines the property as tourist, not agricultural. The power to classify its territory is given by law to the local governments.
(c) Certification of the Department of Agriculture that the property is not suitable and viable for agriculture. The factual nature of the land, its marginal productivity and non-economic feasibility for cultivation, are described in detail.
(d) Acts of DAR itself which approved conversion of contiguous or adjacent land into the Batulao Resorts Complex. DAR described at length the non-agricultural nature of Batulao and of portion of the disputed property, particularly Hacienda Caylaway.
(e) DAR Circulars and Regulations. DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994 subscribes to the Department of Justice opinion that the lands classified as non-agricultural before the CARP Law, June 15, 1988, are exempt from CARP. DAR Order dated January 22, 1991 led to the Batulao Tourist Area. DAR Order in Case No. H-9999-050-97, May 17, 1999, exempted 13.5 hectares of Caylaway, similarly situated and of the same nature as Batulao, from coverage. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1996, if followed, would clearly exclude subject property from coverage.
As earlier shown, DAR has, in this case, violated its own circulars, rules and regulations.
In addition to the DAR circulars and orders which DAR itself has not observed, the petitioner has submitted a municipal map of Nasugbu, Batangas (Annex "E", Manifestation dated July 23, 1999). The geographical location of Palico, Banilad, and Caylaway in relation to the GDFI property, now Batulao Tourist Resort, shows that the properties subject of this case are equally, if not more so, appropriate for conversion as the GDFI resort.
Petitioner's application for the conversion of its lands from agricultural to non-agricultural was meant to stop the DAR from proceeding with the compulsory acquisition of the lands and to seek a clear and authoritative declaration that said lands are outside of the coverage of the CARL and can not be subjected to agrarian reform.
Petitioner assails respondent's refusal to convert its lands to non-agricultural use and to recognize Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, stating that respondent DAR has not been consistent in its treatment of applications of this nature. It points out that in the other case involving adjoining lands in Nasugbu, Batangas, respondent DAR ordered the conversion of the lands upon application of Group Developers and Financiers, Inc. Respondent DAR, in that case, issued an Order dated January 22, 1991 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the farmers thereon and finding that:
In fine, on November 27, 1975, or before the movants filed their instant motion for reconsideration, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520, declaring the municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in the province of Cavite and the municipality of Nasugbu in the province of Batangas as tourist zone. Precisely, the landholdings in question are included in such proclamation. Up to now, this office is not aware that said issuance has been repealed or amended (Petition, Annex "W"; Rollo, p. 238).
The DAR Orders submitted by petitioner, and admitted by DAR in its Rejoinder (Rejoinder of DAR dated August 20, 1999), show that DAR has been inconsistent to the extent of being arbitrary.
Apart from the DAR Orders approving the conversion of the adjoining property now called Batulao Resort Complex and the DAR Order declaring parcels of the Caylaway property as not covered by CARL, a major Administrative Order of DAR may also be mentioned.
The Department of Justice in DOJ Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990 (Annex "A" of Petitioner's Manifestation) stated that DAR was given authority to approve land conversions only after June 15, 1988 when RA 6657, the CARP Law, became effective. Following the DOJ Opinion, DAR issued its AO No. 06, Series of 1994 providing for the Guidelines on Exemption Orders (Annex "B", Id.). The DAR Guidelines state that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of CARL are exempt from its coverage. Significantly, the disputed properties in this case were classified as tourist zone by no less than a Presidential Proclamation as early as 1975, long before 1988.
The above, petitioner maintains, constitute unequal protection of the laws. Indeed, the Constitution guarantees that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws" (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1). Respondent DAR, therefore, has no alternative but to abide by the declaration in Presidential Proclamation 1520, just as it did in the case of Group Developers and Financiers, Inc., and to treat petitioners' properties in the same way it did the lands of Group Developers, i.e., as part of a tourist zone not suitable for agriculture.
On the issue of non-payment of just compensation which results in a taking of property in violation of the Constitution, petitioner argues that the opening of a trust account in its favor did not operate as payment of the compensation within the meaning of Section 16 (e) of RA 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (249 SCRA 149, at 157 [1995]), this Court struck down as null and void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, which provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section 16 (e) of RA 6657.
It is very explicit therefrom (Section 16 [e]) that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
x x x x x x x x x
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its powers to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
There being no valid payment of just compensation, title to petitioner's landholdings cannot be validly transferred to the Government. A close scrutiny of the procedure laid down in Section 16 of RA 6657 shows the clear legislative intent that there must first be payment of the fair value of the land subject to agrarian reform, either directly to the affected landowner or by deposit of cash or LBP bonds in the DAR-designated bank, before the DAR can take possession of the land and request the register of deeds to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. This is only proper inasmuch as title to private property can only be acquired by the government after payment of just compensation In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343, 391 [1989]), this Court held:
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Necessarily, the issuance of the CLOAs by respondent DAR on October 30, 1993 and their distribution to farmer-beneficiaries were illegal inasmuch as no valid payment of compensation for the lands was as yet effected. By law, Certificates of Land Ownership Award are issued only to the beneficiaries after the DAR takes actual possession of the land (RA 6657, Sec. 24), which in turn should only be after the receipt by the landowner of payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, after the deposit of the compensation for the land in cash or in LBP bonds (RA 6657, Sec. 16[e]).
Respondents argue that the Land Bank ruling should not be made to apply to the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's landholdings in 1993, because it occurred prior to the promulgation of the said decision (October 6, 1995). This is untenable. Laws may be given retroactive effect on constitutional considerations, where the prospective application would result in a violation of a constitutional right. In the case at bar, the expropriation of petitioner's lands was effected without a valid payment of just compensation, thus violating the Constitutional mandate that "(p)rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 9). Hence, to deprive petitioner of the benefit of the Land Bank ruling on the mere expedient that it came later than the actual expropriation would be repugnant to petitioner's fundamental rights.
The controlling last two (2) pages of the ponencia state:
Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.
I disagree with the view that this Court cannot nullify illegally issued CLOA's but must ask the DAR to first reverse and correct itself.
Given the established facts, there was no valid transfer of petitioner's title to the Government. This being so, there was also no valid title to transfer to third persons; no basis for the issuance of CLOAs.
Equally important, CLOAs do not have the nature of Torrens Title. Administrative cancellation of title is sufficient to invalidate them.ℒαwρhi৷
The Court of Appeals said so in its Resolution in this case. It stated:
Contrary to the petitioner's argument that issuance of CLOAs to the beneficiaries prior to the deposit of the offered price constitutes violation of due process, it must be stressed that the mere issuance of the CLOAs does not vest in the farmer/grantee ownership of the land described therein.
At most the certificate merely evidences the government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land. Thus failure on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligations is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of transfer. Moreover, where there is a finding that the property is indeed not covered by CARP, then reversion to the landowner shall consequently be made, despite issuance of CLOAs to the beneficiaries. (Resolution dated January 17, 1997, p. 6)
DAR Administrative Order 03, Series of 1996 (issued on August 8, 1996; Annex "F" of Petitioner's Manifestation) outlines the procedure for the reconveyance to landowners of properties found to be outside the coverage of CARP. DAR itself acknowledges that they can administratively cancel CLOAs if found to be erroneous. From the detailed provisions of the Administrative Order, it is apparent that there are no impediments to the administrative cancellation of CLOAs improperly issued over exempt properties. The procedure is followed all over the country. The DAR Order spells out that CLOAs are not Torrens Titles. More so if they affect land which is not covered by the law under which they were issued. In its Rejoinder, respondent DAR states:
3.2. And, finally, on the authority of DAR/DARAB to cancel erroneously issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) or Certificate of Landownership Awards (CLOAs), same is enshrined, it is respectfully submitted, in Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657.
In its Supplemental Manifestation, petitioner points out, and this has not been disputed by respondents, that DAR has also administratively cancelled twenty five (25) CLOAs covering Nasugbu properties owned by the Manila Southcoast Development Corporation near subject Roxas landholdings. These lands were found not suitable for agricultural purposes because of soil and topographical characteristics similar to those of the disputed properties in this case.
The former DAR Secretary, Benjamin T. Leong, issued DAR Order dated January 22, 1991 approving the development of property adjacent and contiguous to the subject properties of this case into the Batulao Tourist Resort. Petitioner points out that Secretary Leong, in this Order, has decided that the land —
1. Is, as contended by the petitioner GDFI "hilly, mountainous, and characterized by poor soil condition and nomadic method of cultivation, hence not suitable to agriculture."
2. Has as contiguous properties two haciendas of Roxas y Cia and found by Agrarian Reform Team Leader Benito Viray to be "generally rolling, hilly and mountainous and strudded (sic) with long and narrow ridges and deep gorges. Ravines are steep grade ending in low dry creeks."
3. Is found in an. area where "it is quite difficult to provide statistics on rice and corn yields because there are no permanent sites planted. Cultivation is by Kaingin Method."
4. Is contiguous to Roxas Properties in the same area where "the people entered the property surreptitiously and were difficult to stop because of the wide area of the two haciendas and that the principal crop of the area is sugar . . .." (emphasis supplied).
I agree with petitioner that under DAR AO No. 03, Series of 1996, and unlike lands covered by Torrens Titles, the properties falling under improperly issued CLOAs are cancelled by mere administrative procedure which the Supreme Court can declare in cases properly and adversarially submitted for its decision. If CLOAs can under the DAR's own order be cancelled administratively, with more reason can the courts, especially the Supreme Court, do so when the matter is clearly in issue.
With due respect, there is no factual basis for the allegation in the motion for intervention that farmers have been cultivating the disputed property.
The property has been officially certified as not fit for agriculture based on slope, terrain, depth, irrigability, fertility, acidity, and erosion. DAR, in its Order dated January 22, 1991, stated that "it is quite difficult to provide statistics on rice and corn yields (in the adjacent property) because there are no permanent sites planted. Cultivation is by kaingin method." Any allegations of cultivation, feasible and viable, are therefore falsehoods.
The DAR Order on the adjacent and contiguous GDFI property states that "(T)he people entered the property surreptitiously and were difficult to stop . . .."
The observations of Court of Appeals Justices Verzola and Magtolis in this regard, found in their dissenting opinion (Rollo, p. 116), are relevant:
2.9 The enhanced value of land in Nasugbu, Batangas, has attracted unscrupulous individuals who distort the spirit of the Agrarian Reform Program in order to turn out quick profits. Petitioner has submitted copies of CLOAs that have been issued to persons other than those who were identified in the Emancipation Patent Survey Profile as legitimate Agrarian Reform beneficiaries for particular portions of petitioner's lands. These persons to whom the CLOAs were awarded, according to petitioner, are not and have never been workers in petitioner's lands. Petitioners say they are not even from Batangas but come all the way from Tarlac. DAR itself is not unaware of the mischief in the implementation of the CARL in some areas of the country, including Nasugbu. In fact, DAR published a "WARNING TO THE PUBLIC" which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer of April 15, 1994 regarding this malpractice.
2.10 Agrarian Reform does not mean taking the agricultural property of one and giving it to another and for the latter to unduly benefit therefrom by subsequently "converting" the same property into non-agricultural purposes.
2.11 The law should not be interpreted to grant power to the State, thru the DAR, to choose who should benefit from multi-million peso deals involving lands awarded to supposed agrarian reform beneficiaries who then apply for conversion, and thereafter sell the lands as non-agricultural land.
Respondents, in trying to make light of this problem, merely emphasize that CLOAs are not titles. They state that "rampant selling of rights", should this occur, could be remedied by the cancellation or recall by DAR.
In the recent case of "Hon. Carlos O. Fortich, et. al. vs. Hon. Renato C. Corona, et. al." (G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998), this Court found the CLOAs given to the respondent farmers to be improperly issued and declared them invalid. Herein petitioner Roxas and Co., Inc. has presented a stronger case than petitioners in the aforementioned case. The procedural problems especially the need for referral to the Court of Appeals are not present. The instant petition questions the Court of Appeals decision which acted on the administrative decisions. The disputed properties in the present case have been declared non-agricultural not so much because of local government action but by Presidential Proclamation. They were found to be non-agricultural by the Department of Agriculture, and through unmistakable implication, by DAR itself. The zonification by the municipal government, approved by the provincial government, is not the only basis.
On a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them. As we held in Land Bank (supra.):
It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:
. . . social justice — or any justice for that matter — is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the petition for certiorari; and to declare Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, to be non-agricultural and outside the scope of Republic Act No. 6657. I further vote to declare the Certificates of Land Ownership Award issued by respondent Department of Agrarian Reform null and void and to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the compulsory acquisition of the lands within the subject properties. I finally vote to DENY the motion for intervention.
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