Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 134307 December 21, 1998
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring opinion;
The pivotal issue proffered in the Petition for Prohibition — seeking (a) the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 22018 against petitioner pending with the Sandiganbayan and (b) to prevent the latter from further proceedings with the case — is the claim made by petitioner of an impairment of his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of his case. I share the view reached by Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing that the petition should be denied. A breach of the right of an accused to the speedy disposition of his case may truly have consequential effects but it is not enough that there be some procrastination in the proceedings. In order to justify the dismissal of the criminal case, foreclosing thereby even a rectification of its handling, it must be established that the proceedings unquestionably have been marred by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.1 Hence, this Court has stressed in one case:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as lenght of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay are considered.2
Petitioner additionally scores on the fact that respondent Sandiganbayan issued the warrant for this arrest based solely on the 2nd June 1992 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and the 16th January 1995 Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. He has a point. The issuance of a warrant of arrest is one of grave responsibility on the part of the issuing judge. While the judge need not himself examine the complainant and his witnesses, he, however, must personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and only on the basis thereof can he validly and correspondingly issue a warrant of arrest. The judge may, if he finds it needful, require the submission of additional affidavits of witnesses or papers to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence or absence of probable cause.3 In Ho vs. People,4 the Court, positing that the issuing judge must have sufficient supporting documents, besides the bare report of the prosecutor, upon which to make an independent judgment, has said:
. . . (T)the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide indepedently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and indepedently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly to burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworm statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make has indefendent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to make his indefendant judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report, the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the certification or the report oft he investigating officer.
The foregoing dictum would, however, be inconsequential in a case when the person on whom the warrant is served has, in the some other way, effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. One such case is by the posting of bail.5 The fact that the issuance of the warrant of arrest is assailed for its procedural flaws before the posting of bail is of little moment since the arrest relates merely to the jurisdiction of the court which posting would, of course, only be feasible if the court allowing it would have first acquired lawful jurisdiction over person at the time.6
In Callanta vs. Villanueva7 the Court had occasion to state:
With the express admission by petitioner that she had posted the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty,ℒαwρhi৷ it becomes furtile to assail the validity of the issuance of the warrants of arrest. This excerpt from the opinion of Justice Sanchez in Zacarias vs. Cruz [30 SCRA 728] finds pertinence. Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the arrest of a person, estops him from discussing the validity of his arrest. In the recent case of Luna vs. Plaza ***, our ruling is that were petitioner has filed an application for bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, "he waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted *** prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest." [26 SCRA 310] As a matter of fact, such a doctrine goes back to People vs. Olandag [92 Phil. 286], the opinion being rendered by former Chief Justice Paras. After Zacarias, mention may be made of three other decisions, Bermejo vs. Barrios [31 SCRA 764]; People vs. La Caste [37 SCRA 767], and Manzano vs. Villa [46 SCRA 711]. The latest case in point is People vs. Obngayan [55 SCRA 465] where this Court, through Justice Antonio, after referring to Luna vs. Plaza, again reiterated the ruling "that where the accused has filed bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest [Ibid., 471].
In People vs. Nazareno,8 reiterated in People vs. Timon,9 the Court again declared:
. . . [The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of accused.
Corollarily, the constitutional right of a person to travel may be restricted not only because he may be facing criminal charges but also as being the consequence of the nature and function of a bail. The condition imposed upon him to make himself available at all times whenever the court so requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.10 Nevertheless, I join the majority of my colleagues in directing the temporary lifting for the reasons advanced, which I find to be reasonable and justified, of the ban on travel of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the petition and to order the lifting of the ban on petitioner to travel for the period and under the conditions expressed in the ponencia.
Footnotes
1 Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298; Dela Rosa vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499; Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773, 788.
2 Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, 307.
3 Cruz, Jr. vs. People, 233 SCRA 439, 455.
4 280 SCRA 365, 380-381.
5 See Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525; People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 309, 315; People vs. Abapo, 239 SCRA 373, 384, People vs. Lopez Jr., 245 SCRA 95, 105; People vs. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421, 430; People vs. Lapura, 255 SCRA 85; People vs. Nazareno, 260 CSRA 256, 263; Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402; People vs. Timon, Gr. No. 97841-42, 12 November 1997.
6 People vs. Aruta, G.R. No. 120915, 03 April 1998.
7 Supra.
8 260 SCRA 256.
9 Supra.
10 People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404.
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