FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
In concur in the results, pro hac vice, for it is paramount that matters of national interest deserve a proper place in any forum. The procedural rules in the courts of law, like the locus standi of petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, the propriety of the special legal action of mandamus used as a vehicle to reach this Court on the issues involved and considered by the Court, as well as kindred legal technicalities and nicety raised by respondents to thwart the petition are no trickle matters, to be sure, but I do not see them to be cogent reasons to deny to the Court its taking cognizance of the case.
It is a cardinal principle in constitutional adjudication that anyone who invokes it has a personal and substantial interest on the dispute.1 Jurisprudentially there is either the lenient or the strict approach in the appreciation of legal standing of legal standing. The liberal approach recognizes legal standing to raise constitutional issues of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as taxpayers and citizens, directly affecting them.2 A developing trend appears to be towards a narrow and exacting approach, requiring that a logical nexus must be shown between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power.3
With respect to the right to information, it being a public right where the real parties in interest are the people themselves in general4 and where the only recognized limitations is "public concern," it would seem that the framers of the Constitution have favored the liberal approach. Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a member of the Constitutional Commission, observe:
The real problem, however, lies in determining what matters are of public concern and what are not. Unwitingly perhaps, by this provision the Constitution might have opened a Pandora's box. For certainly every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern. Jurisprudence in fact has said that "public concern," like "public interest," eludes exact definition and embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to kno, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary sitizen.5
Corrolarily, there is need of preserving a certain degree of confidentiality in matters involving national security and public relations, to cite a few,6 and until a balance is struck, the Court may be constrained on occasions to accept an electric notion that frees itself from the shackles of the trenchant requisites of locus standi.
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has a limited life in carying out its tasks and time is running short. It is thus imperative that the Court must hold even now, and remind PCGG, that it has indeed exceeded its bounds in entering into the General and Supplemental Agreements. The agreements clearly suffer from Constitutional and statutory infirmities,7 to wit: (1) The agreements contravene the statute in granting criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs;8 (2) PCGG's commitment to exempt from all form of taxes the property to be retained the Marcos' heirs controverts the Constitution;9 and (3) the government's underatking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroaches upon judicial powers. I also see, like my other colleagues, too much vagueness on such items as the period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestations and the lack of appropriate standards for determining the assets to be forfeited by the government and those to be retained by the Marcoses.
In this respect, while there is legal posibility when the terms of a contract are not totally invalidated and only those opposed to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy are rendered inefficacious, when however, the assailed provisions can be seen to be of essence, like here, the agreement in its entirety can be adversely affected.ℒαwρhi৷ True, the validity or invalidity of a contract is a matter that generally may not be passed upon in a mandamus petitonn, for it is as if petitioner were seeking declaratory relief or an advisory opinion from this Court over which it has no original jurisdiction,10 the immediacy and significance of the issues, neverthless, has impelled the Court to rightly assume jurisdiction and to resolve the incidental, albeit major, issues that evidently and continually vex the parties.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 238, 244.
2 Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitution Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11.
3 Am Jur § 189, 591, S. v. D., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.
4 Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, 36, 37.
5 The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 edition, pp. 336-337.
6 Ibid.
7 Noteworthy is the absence of the President's Impramatur on the agreement.
8 Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-A.
9 Sec. 28 (4), Article VI, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.
10 Sec. 17. Republic Act No. 296, Judiciary Act of 1948; Sec. 5, Art VIII, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines; Remontigue vs. Osmeña, Jr., 129 Phil. 60, 61; Rural Bank of Olongapo, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Land Registration, et al., 102 Phil. 794-795.
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