FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 129567 December 4, 1998
JOCELYN LABARO, represented by her mother, EVELYN LABARO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE VINCENT EDEN C. PANAY and ALFREDO AVIADOR, respondent.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., dissenting;
The petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the 25th June 1997 order of Judge Vincent Eden C. Panay of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, was initially dismissed by this Court, in its resolution of 30 July 1997, due to the failure of petitioner to submit a verified statement of material dates to determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition. Counsel for petitioner forthwith moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition, admitted his failure, apologized for the oversight, and proceeded to supply the needed information. In its resolution of 13 May 1998, the Court, after considering the comment required from and filed by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"), granted the motion for reconsideration, reinstated the petition and directed respondents to comment thereon.
It would appear that in an amended information, dated 19 August 1996, private respondent Alfredo Aviador was charged with rape, thus:
That on or about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21, 1996, at an uninhabited place, in the Municipality of Kayapa, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Jocelyn Lavaro while she was unconscious caused by the violence inflicted upon her by the said accused and by reason thereof she has become insane, to her own damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The case, docketed Criminal Case No. 943-37, was originally raffled to Branch 37 but later assigned to the sala of respondent Judge who, against the opposition registered by the prosecution, issued the questioned order granting the petition for bail of the accused and setting the bail bond in the amount of P200,000.00. The order, in part, read:
The Court as of now, without pre-judging either the alleged crime of rape or the aggravating circumstance of insanity, overrules the opposition and grants the petition.
Premises considered, the accused Alfredo Aviador is admitted to bail for his provisional liberty in the amount of P200,000.00.2
The OSG, when required to comment on the petition, opined that the evidence of guilt of private respondent was strong considering not only the testimony of petitioner but also that of Dr. Antonio Labasan, the Medico Legal Officer, who confirmed a physical finding of rape, as well as that of Dr. Alice Anghad, a psychiatrist assigned at the Mental Health Department of Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, who declared the victim to have developed "psychosis and classified insanity" following the incident. The OSG observed:
The defense never presented any witness to rebut Dra. Anghad's testimony. It was the height of capriciousness, therefore, for public respondent to set aside Dra. Anghad's testimony and to state, without any legal or medical support whatsoever, that psychosis is not the insanity contemplated by law which could aggravate the crime of rape and raise the penalty to death.
Assuming, arguendo, that petitioner did not suffer from any form of insanity as a result of the rape, public respondent still gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he admitted private respondent to bail without considering the evidence presented by the prosecution on the crime of rape itself.3
In response, private respondent Aviador averred that despite the allegation by the prosecution that the rape had been committed on 21 April 1996, the mother of the complainant, strangely, was said to have found the supposed victim, Jocelyn Labaro,4 then 16 years old, with respondent Aviador inside a theater two days later on 23 April 1996. He was initially charged with mere "Acts of Lasciviousness;" later, however, the accusation was upgraded to "Simple Rape." He asked for, and was granted, provisional liberty. Four months later, after Jocelyn was taken to and examined by Dr. Anghad, the information was again amended on the basis of a new averment that the victim supposedly had become insane.
In an indictment for a capital offense, the accused truly is not entitled to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong.5 The burden of showing that such evidence of guilt is strong lies with the prosecution. It is the duty of the judge to hear the parties and to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented.6 When the judge views the evidence of guilt in such a capital offense not to be strong, the grant of bail becomes a matter of sound discretion on his part.7
In petitions of the nature now before the Court, i.e., the extraordinary remedies of Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65, the question is not whether the trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound discretion but whether the judge has committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in its decision or order such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or completely acting on bias and whim.8 Even assuming that the judge has erred in his judgment, so long as grave abuse of discretion is not evident in his action, the aforesaid exceptional remedies are unavailable. Abuse of discretion must be such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion and hostility.9
I am not disposed to conclude, after closely reviewing the records, that the trial judge can be held guilty of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in granting bail to the accused. Although it would be precipitate, if not indeed wrong, to now rule on whether or not the victim has indeed been raped without going into the merits and thereby prejudging the case (the trial is yet to begin), two points have been raised by private respondent which, at this stage, could at least acquit the trial court from the charge, in my view, that he has utterly discarded the evidence given by the prosecution.
Firstly, private complainant was said to have been raped on 21 April 1996. Unaccountably, the complaint was filed only after the complainant's mother saw Jocelyn with private respondent on 23 April 1996, or two days later, inside a movie house. The trial court in granting the application of bail observed:
The alleged rape happened at around 4:30 P.M. of April 21, 1996. Two days later, because of alleged force, threat and fear of the accused, she went to see a movie with him at around 2:30 P.M. of April 23, 1996 at a movie house in Solano, Nueva Vizcaya around 40 kilometers from Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya from where she was allegedly forcibly taken. They were caught inside the movie house by her mother. The following day, April 24, she with her mother, filed the Complaint.10
Secondly, the prosecution apparently gave too much emphasis on the opinion of Dr. Anghad that private complainant had been found by her to be suffering from post-traumatic depression and psychosis characterized by "laughing inappropriately, silly affect (sic), with auditory hallucinations and evassive (sic) attitude.11 When she testified on 27 May 1997, however, Dr. Anghad did not appear to have been sufficiently thorough in her examination of the victim; thus:
Q How can you monitor the treatment?
A Although she comes only 2x for consultation, her mother always get medicines from out patient Department in Tuguegarao, sir.
Q When was that, the last time that you treated her before you came to this Court?
A She came together with the mother to get the medicine last February and March, sir.
Q So you did not observe the patient anymore except the giving of medicine to the mother?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, now can you conclude that she is still suffering from mild psychosis when you did not see or observe the patient?
A That was according to the verbalization of the mother that the patient is walking toe and pro having unsleepness night and having fears even up to the present.ℒαwρhi৷
Q So the last time that you saw the patient is that when she came to Tuguegarao on August 9, 1996?
COURT:
Q So it was the first and the last time that she came for examination on August 9, 1996? there was no more follow up check up or appearances of the patient before you nor a follow up personal examination on the patient by you? After August 9?
A No more, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q How do you know that the patient is still suffering from such kind of illness the way you describe here in Court that patient when you did not see her anymore after the August 9, 1996 and you based only your assumption because the mother is getting medicines in your hospital at Tuguegarao?
A We knew it from some mothers of the patients who goes in and out of the hospital getting medicines, one thing more the mother will not be risking to give the medicine to her psychotic daughter if she is not really suffering from such kind of mental disorder and she will not be risking her trip in going to Tuguegarao just to get the medicine if it is not really needed, sir.
Q How do you know that the patient is really taking those medicines being taken by the mother from you?
A I am confident that her mother is giving the complete medication,
sir.12
The Court, it should perhaps be stressed once again, is not called upon in special civil actions of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to look into the question of whether or not the court a quo has committed an error of judgment, such error, if at all, being correctible at the proper time by a petition for review but whether or not it is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its assailed action. In drafting this dissenting opinion, I have seen it fit to avoid making any disquisition or statement that would in any way signify my prejudgment in the main case; accordingly, my dissenting vote should not be so taken as also an expression of opinion that the case for the prosecution is necessarily weak.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 17.
2 Rollo, p. 19.
3 Rollo, pp. 67-68.
4 Per the Information and the Statement in the dialect signed by the victim and her mother, their surname is Lavaro, not Labaro.
5 Cardines vs. Rosete, 242 SCRA 557.
6 See Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, 241 SCRA 84.
7 Baylon vs. Sison, 243 SCRA 284.
8 Del Mundo vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 425.
9 Commission on Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 200.
10 Rollo, p. 41.
11 Rollo, p. 25.
12 Rollo, pp. 91-101.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
